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17 DEC 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VP-24 AAR ser 2-52 of 21 Oct 1952

From: Commander Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-53)

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report P4Y-2B BuNo. 59988

1. Forwarded, readdressed, concurring with the conclusions of
the aircraft accident board as modified by subsequent endorse-
ments.

2. Lessons learned in this accident will be given wide publicity.

(b) (6)

By direction

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COMFAIRWINGSLANT
CTG 80.2
CO VP-24

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Serial: 20/ 2183

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SECURITY INFORMATION

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VP-24 Aircraft Accident Report serial 2-52

From: Commander Fleet Air Wings, Atlantic Fleet, and
Commander Fleet Air Wing FIVE

To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-53)
(1) Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet
(2) Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report 2-52

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 2710.13
(b) FASRon 795 ltr ser 360 dtd 22 Dec 1951

1. Forwarded, concurring in general with the comments, conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, the Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR, and Commander Task Group 80.2, subject to the following:

a. It is considered that the primary cause of this accident is a result of an excess of self confidence engendered by a history of many successful landings under bad conditions at this Station. This excess of confidence is evidenced by the location of the pilot in the right hand seat; by the non-use of diversion fields; by no apparent consideration of possible clearing of weather, despite the large amount of fuel remaining in the aircraft; and by no apparent hesitancy in allowing the approach to be made under admittedly marginal conditions by a pilot who had not made a recent GCA approach to Naval Station, Argentia.

b. This command concurs partially with the remarks made in paragraph 3(c) of the second endorsement. It appears that "no gyro" approaches below GCA minimums are potentially dangerous, in that low altitude fully developed standard rates of turn tend to present a wing tip instead of landing gear for inadvertent first ground contact. A search of the directives concerning GCA and instrument flying has revealed no specific instructions stating that standard rate instrument turns are required during a "no gyro" GCA approach. However, it is understood that the NATTU, Olather GCA School and the All Weather Flight School teach this method and indoctrinate instrument pilots and GCA controllers accordingly. As a practical matter, it is further understood that final controllers normally require only small corrections during final stages of an approach and, therefore, give only very brief turn orders allowing aircraft insufficient time to reach a standard turn rate and the bank required therefor. However, it is considered that

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SECURITY INFORMATION

"no gyro" approaches might possibly be a source of confusion and possible danger and that instructions for their use should be added to details in OpNav Instruction 3721.1.

c. While paragraph 6 of reference (a) states that under normal conditions airfields should not be closed solely because of weather conditions, the immediate operational commander (in this case the squadron commander or his representative) and the operations department of the airfield both have the authority to divert any aircraft to an alternate where more desirable conditions obtain. It is considered that both the immediate operational commander and the station operations department should be especially alert during marginal weather conditions, such as obtained in this case, in order to be able to give timely advice and, if necessary, diversion orders to individual aircraft so that undue hazard may be prevented. Supervision of operations by squadron personnel who are thoroughly familiar with physical characteristics of specific aircraft and relative abilities of various flight crews should be of considerable value in making decisions with regard to landing under marginal conditions diverting or delaying. The close supervision of flight operations of individual aircraft is considered especially important at isolated bases, such as Argentia, which are subject to rapid and radical changes of weather.

d. It is noted that paragraph 3.d of the second endorsement concurs in the desirability of installing approach lighting (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

Exhaustive tests have proven the requirement of approach lights as a low visibility landing aid. This command considers that this vitally important Naval Air Station which experiences frequent low visibility conditions, should be equipped with every practicable aid to flight safety. A study of the overwater approaches to runways indicates that installation of approach lights is feasible.

e. This command does not concur in (b) (5)

(b) (5) as recommended in paragraph 3 of the first endorsement unless there appears to be a need for expert opinion with regard to certain highly technical equipment which may have been involved in the accident. It is believed that most squadrons have adequate talent to conduct a thorough analysis of the accident and to submit well considered and informative reports. The subject report is considered to be in this category and bears out the opinion of this command that reports, conscientiously prepared in accordance with current directives, adequately fulfill their intended purpose.


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2. Commander Fleet Air Wings, Atlantic Fleet, recommends the following action:

- a. Investigate "no gyro" GCA approaches on heavy multiengine aircraft using standard rate turns as now practiced, to determine if any exceptional hazard is involved.
- b. Add details of "no gyro" approach instructions to OpNav Instruction 3721.1, based on results of the above investigation.
- c. Operational and airfield commanders be indoctrinated to exercise detailed supervision over flights when weather is close to GCA minimums. Commander Fleet Air Wings, Atlantic Fleet, will take appropriate action for his units.
- d. That early action be taken to install a standard approach light system for the regularly used instrument runways at Naval Station, Argentia.
- e. That crash helmets be provided for crews of patrol-type aircraft and that they be worn during landing and take off operations. This has been previously recommended in reference (b), concurred in by this command.


G. B. H. HALL

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A25
Serial: 2717
30 Oct 1952

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VP-24 Aircraft Accident Report serial 2-52

From: Commander Task Group 80.2
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-53)
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air Wing FIVE
(2) Commander Fleet Air Wings, Atlantic Fleet
(3) Commander Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

Encl: (3) Contour Map of area adjacent to end of runway 25

1. Forwarded.

2. The conclusions and recommendations contained in the Accident Report and in the first endorsement thereto are concurred in with exceptions and comments as set forth in this endorsement.

3. With reference to the Accident Report -

a. Item (31) subparagraph k. states that the aircraft made a left turn without instructions from GCA to correct to the center of the runway. After examining all available information it is believed that the board should also have found that the aircraft made a right turn, just prior to and hence necessitating, the left turn mentioned above, this right turn also being made without instructions from GCA.

b. Item (33), sets forth the conclusions and recommendations of the accident board. The conclusion that (b) (5) and the recommendation that (b) (5) (b) (5) is not concurred in. Enclosure (3) to this endorsement gives contours and elevations of the area in question. It will be noted that the high point of the roadway nearest the first point of impact is approximately 16.3 feet above MSL while the high point at the end of the runway is 24 feet. (b) (5)

(b) (5) Plans have been completed and money appropriated to construct a 1500 foot extension to the end of runway 25. Enclosure (3) (inset) indicates the relation of this extension to the existing runway and to the beach line. Construction of this extension by MCB's is tentatively planned to begin early in 1953. It is not believed practicable to prepare the area in question to the extent that would be required to support a landing aircraft of the P4Y type or one of comparable weight. In the case of the accident being reported on there is some doubt, considering the contours and texture of the ground in that area, the force of the first impact, and the attitude of the aircraft on first impact, that the end results would have been minimized (b) (5).


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c. Item (33) subparagraph (d) 3., recommends that no gyro approaches be eliminated when making approaches below GCA minimums except in emergencies. OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3721.1 is interpreted to the effect that approaches to touchdown during weather conditions below GCA minimums are to be made only during an emergency. However, due consideration must be given to the rapid and radical changes in weather that often occur at this station and to such a situation that apparently occurred in the accident reported on. If a pilot elects to continue his approach even though he is not contact on passing GCA minimums, the GCA controller should do everything in his power to get the plane lined up with the runway over the touch down point. If the plane does not respond adequately to gyro headings it would appear logical to resort to the no-gyro approach. It is not considered that the no-gyro approach imposes unacceptable demands on pilots or planes.

d. Item (33) subparagraph (d) 4., The desirability of having approach lights at the approach end of runway 25 is concurred in.

(b) (5)



4. With reference to paragraph 3. of the first endorsement -

a. It is believed that the limits set forth in OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3721.1 are an adequate measure of an erratic approach. While three no-gyro turns given in 25 seconds, as noted in the first paragraph of the first endorsement, do appear to be an abnormal requirement the aircraft responded to these directions although apparently executing exaggerated turns. It should also be noted that on a GCA final approach that one transmission by the final controller is required every five (5) seconds.

b. Comments regarding no-gyro turns, lengthening the approach end of runway 25, and installation of high intensity approach lights are contained in paragraph 3. above.

c. It has been the policy at this station to have the outside GCA observer outside but in the vicinity of the GCA unit during approaches. What aid the observer would have been in the instance reported on, had he been at the approach end of the runway, is not readily apparent. However, as soon as communication arrangements can be made and standard operating procedures arrived at, it is planned to adopt the recommendation made in paragraph 3. subparagraph f.

(b) (5)



(b) (5)



5. The Commander Task Group 80.2 desires to point up the thoroughness and attention to detail by VP-24 in the preparation of this accident report. It is also believed worthy of note that during the period VP-24 has been deployed to this station they have maintained a two plane detachment at NAS Patuxent River, Md., which also participated in commitments at Eglin Field, Fla. During this same period but at separate times VP-24 participated in Operation Sunac with a two plane detachment in Thule, Greenland, Operation Emigrant under operational control of ComAirCanLant and in Operation Noramex under operational control of CTG 42.0. During this period the operational performance of VP-24 has been excellent and it is not believed that the accident reported on herein is indicative of inherent deficiencies in the squadron.



F. B. SCHAEDE

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PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, NEW YORK, N.Y.

VP-24/A25
Ser: 803

22 OCT 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VP-24 AAR Ser 2-52

From: Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-53)
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 80.2
(2) Commander Fleet Air Wing FIVE
(3) Commander Fleet Air Wings, Atlantic Fleet
(4) Commander Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

Encl: (1) GCA Approach for P4Y-2B BuNo 59988
(2) VP-24 AAR 2-52 of 21 October 1952

1. Forwarded, concurring with the findings and opinions of the Aircraft Accident Board with the following additions and variances of opinion:

a. A review and study of the GCA transcript (Enclosure 7 to the AAR) and by plotting the no gyro turns given by the final controller, a rough indication of the position of the aircraft with reference to the centerline of the runway can be established (Enclosure 1). Enclosure (1) is not to any scale, and it is evident that the pilot did answer the no gyro turns, but it does indicate that the pilot was erratic in the final approach with regard to headings. Further it can be established that within approximately twenty-five (25) seconds (5000 feet at 120 knots) three (3) no gyro turns were given. It will be further noted that at no time inside of one (1) mile from the end of the runway was the aircraft on course.

b. The GCA transcript (Enclosure 7 to the AAR), the statement of the final controller (Enclosure 9 to the AAR) and Enclosure (1) indicate that inside of approximately 1500 feet from the end of the runway, GCA was not controlling the aircraft, but was following the movements of the aircraft. This is substantiated by the statement of the Elevation Position Operator (Enclosure 8 to the AAR), "From my scope he appeared slightly high at a half mile, then he was on glide path and holding until just less than a quarter of a mile when he appeared to go below slightly. (I did not lower my cursor, because he disappeared into the ground return immediately after)". Therefore the last indication that the final controller and ultimately the pilot had was that the aircraft was on glide path and holding.

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Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

c. In variance with item (29) of the AAR the sequence of events from approximately 1500 feet from the end of the runway are believed to be as follows:

The pilot was given the information that "the runway centerline to your right", so he started a turn to the right. Then he was given the information that "you're drifting right rapidly", so he stopped his turn and broke contact. Having no indication from GCA that he was dangerously low he started a left turn back toward the runway making initial contact with the ground. It was after initial contact that the final controller gave him "Now you're turning left and on course and on glide path".

d. Enclosure (70) to the AAR indicates that the Radio Altimeter was on the high scale immediately after the crash. The force of the crash being tremendous it is possible that it could have been jarred from low to high scale. However, it is believed that the setting of the radio altimeter on high scale was not a contributing factor in the crash. The radio altimeter is located on the portside of the instrument panel and the field pressure had been set on the pressure altimeters.

2. The conclusions of the accident board are concurred with and the following action has been taken to correct the situation and prevent the recurrence of similar accidents within this command.

a. It has been re-stressed to all pilots, special and standard instrument ratings, that the exercise of judgement in attempting a GCA approach and landing is paramount, due consideration being given for the hours of fuel on board, weather at alternatives and the nature of the flight involved.

b. All pilots have been instructed in the limitations of GCA and the importance of taking automatic waveoff if not contact at GCA minimums, and an emergency does not exist. (The one exception to this rule being an emergency landing).

c. The current in-use Landing Check-Off list includes "Radio Altimeter" "On low scale" and the importance and mandatory use of the check-off lists has been emphasized.

d. All landings under instrument conditions will be made with the pilot controlling the aircraft from the port seat.

e. Crews will be at ditching stations on all landings, ditchings and takeoff's.

f. The importance of "instantaneous reactions" in an emergency, namely to "add power or to chop it all" has been stressed to all pilots.

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Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

3. The following recommendations are of a more than general nature:
- a. If the final controller observes the pilot erratic in the final give him a mandatory waveoff if he doesn't take one himself.
 - b. Do not give "no sync" turns in the final. There is a tendency to put the wing down in a "turn", while a turn to heading can be skidded.
 - c. (b) (5)
 - d. Install high intensity approach lights on the left hand side of the approach to runway 25.
 - e. Provide crash helmets for the members of the crews of patrol type aircraft.
 - f. If possible have GCA outside lockout at the end of the runway in use for an instrument approach.
 - g. Extend the time limit of submission of LAR on accidents of a serious nature in order to implement more thorough investigation.
 - h. (b) (5)


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(29.) P4Y-2B, BuNo. 59988, LT HORTON, PPC returned to N.S. Argentia Newfoundland from an operational flight of 8.7 hours duration. During the flight LT HORTON squadron check pilot was assigned to check LTJG LLLIS for PPC. At 2330 the pilot contacted approach control on VHF reporting his position as 35 miles from the airfield at 2000 feet instrument flight rules, Enclosure (6). Approach control cleared Navy 9988 to the Argentia range station at the assigned altitude. In addition, the approach controller advised the pilot that the present weather at N.S. Argentia was ceiling indefinite 100 feet obscured, one-quarter mile visibility in fog, wind direction South southwest 5 knot and the altimeter setting 3040. The pilot was also notified that GCA was standing by on an assigned VHF frequency but instructed the pilot to remain on the VHF approach control frequency until further notice. At approximately 2325, the pilot informed the approach controller he was having difficulty with VHF reception and requested 3105 Bilocycles as a secondary frequency in the event of VHF failure. GCA complied with this request and in turn notified the approach controller they had a target one mile south of the range station and would accept the aircraft on a heading of 325° magnetic. At 2343 GCA informed approach control that radio and radar contact with 9988 had been established. Enclosures (1), (2), (3) (4), (5), apply to the preceding information.

GCA commenced controlling the aircraft in a normal right-hand approach to the duty runway 25 at 2344, Enclosure (6). The aircraft was turned on the final approach course at approximately eight and one-quarter miles from the end of the runway at 1500 feet. The GCA final controller then instructed the pilot as follows; "If you do not have the approach end of runway in sight upon reaching GCA minimums, you will execute an emergency pull-up and carry out emergency instructions as previously outlined", Enclosure (7). The aircraft reached the glide path at approximately six miles and commenced a standard rate of descent. A normal rate of descent was maintained except for slight variations of altitude and direction until approximately one and three-quarter miles from the end of the runway. At this position the aircraft was observed 50 feet low on the glide path but still within minimums. The aircraft returned to the glide path at one and one-quarter miles. At one mile the approach controller instructed the pilot to disregard his gyro because the pilot did not appear to be making the necessary directional corrections. Subsequent corrections made by the aircraft indicated that these instructions were understood. At one mile the aircraft was also observed 50 feet above the glide path. At one-half mile the final controller advised the pilot he had reached GCA minimums and was dropping in on the glide path. The aircraft then maintained a standard rate of descent but at one-quarter mile was observed to drop

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slightly below the glide path and immediately disappear into the ground return before the GCA elevation operator could follow with his cursor as indicated in Enclosure (8). This action did not seem unusual to the operator. At the same time the final controller informed the pilot that he was making a left turn. The aircraft then made initial contact with the ground. Enclosures (10), (11), (12), and (13) are statements of GCA personnel.

The initial impact was 548 feet short and in line with the starboard edge of runway 25 as indicated on Enclosure (14). The aircraft was in a left bank and the port wing scraped the top of the road located in the approach end of runway 25, Enclosure (15). The port wheel touched down ~~15~~ feet short of the 2 feet high road bed, then collided with this embankment as did the propellor of the port outboard engine. Power was added and the aircraft continued toward the runway. At a position 200 feet short of the runway, the port wing tip again struck the ground. The aircraft continued on to the runway making a left banking turn dragging the port wing, Enclosure (16). The bank increased to an inverted position when the aircraft collided with the ground on the nose. At this position the engines were thrown from their mounts directly ahead, Enclosure (17). The momentum of the impact then caused the aircraft to fall over on the ventral side righting itself again striking the ground but with the fore and aft axis now approximately 130 degrees to its path of travel. From this position the entire aircraft slid sideways separating in three sections, the flight deck, the wing section, and the tail section. The flight deck section came to rest approximately 135 feet from the second major impact point and 130 degrees to the path of travel. The tail section separated and slid sideways along the original path and came to rest 200 feet from the second major impact position approximately 160 degrees to its path. The wing section separated from the flight deck section became inverted and came to rest against the tail section at an angle of 120 degrees to its path and 210 feet from the major impact position, Enclosure (18).

The crash equipment and ambulances arrived on the scene promptly and extinguished two small fires then commenced rescue operations, Enclosures (57), (58), (59), (60), and (61). Enclosure (19) indicates the positions of the crash equipment at the time of the fatal accident.

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PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY FOUR
NAVY #103, FLEET POST OFFICE, NEW YORK, N.Y.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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- (30.) The first damage to the aircraft occurred at the initial point of impact 548 feet short of runway 25, Enclosures (15) and (22). At this point the port wing hit the surface of the elevated road followed almost immediately by the propellor of the number one engine, Enclosure (20). The port main gear struck the ground 15 feet short of the elevated road and continued into the side of the road bed, Enclosure (21). The impact at an estimated speed of 125 knots and an angle of approximately 5 degrees produced unknown damage to the port wing tip and bending the propellor blades causing the propellor and nose section of number one engine to shear off. The propellor struck the ground 130 feet from the impact point and came to rest 65 feet from the approach end of runway 25, Enclosures (23) and (24). After hitting the roadbed the port main gear oleo was sheared spraying hydraulic fluid across the road, Enclosures (25) and (26), and the broken main gear piston dropped out shortly thereafter, Enclosure (27). The port main gear hanging by the drag strut broke loose and came to rest as indicated in Enclosures (28), (29), and (30) after bouncing down the runway, Enclosure (31) (32). A portion of the port landing flap, Enclosure (33), was torn off by the port main gear when it broke loose and came to rest about 250 feet from the end of the runway, Enclosure (16). The port wing tip again struck the ground about 200 feet from the end of the runway and dragged along the ground striking the outboard starboard threshold light, Enclosure (34). The plane continued in an arc across the runway in an increasing bank to the 1 ft dragging the port wing tip, Enclosure (16). At the time the plane left the runway, 430 feet from the beginning, along the port edge, it was in a vertical bank missing a high intensity light by 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ feet, Enclosure (35) and (36). The aircraft became inverted and collided nose first with the ground 150 feet from the port edge of runway 25, Enclosure (37). At this position the engines were thrown from their mounts directly ahead of the aircraft. Plexiglass from the bow turret dome, Enclosure (38), and the positions of the engines indicate that the aircraft was inverted upon colliding with the ground, Enclosure (17). The airspeed is estimated at 110 knots and the angle of impact at 45 degrees. The momentum at this impact then caused the aircraft to fall over on the ventral side righting itself again striking the ground but with the fore and axis now approximately 130 degrees to its former path of travel, Enclosure (17). From this position the entire aircraft slid sideways separating in three sections; the flight deck, the wing section, and the tail section, Enclosures (18) and (40). The flight deck section came to rest approximately 135 feet from the second major impact position and 130 degrees to the path of travel, Enclosures (41), (42), and (43).

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The tail section upon separating from the wing section slid sideways along the original path and came to rest 200 feet from the second major impact position approximately 160 degrees to its path. The wing section separated from the flight deck section, became inverted and continued forward, coming to rest against the tail section at an angle of 120 degrees to its path and 210 feet from the second major impact position, Enclosures (18), (44), (45); (46), (47), (48); and (49). Enclosures (64), (65), (66), (67), (68), (69), (70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76), (77), and (78) are additional photographs which indicate the damage to the aircraft.

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UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, NEW YORK, N.Y.

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(31.) During the investigation, the following pertinent facts were uncovered:

- (a) The weather at NS, Argentia was below GCA minimums and the weather at alternates was satisfactory. Enclosure (3).
(b) Gas load at the time of landing was approximately 735 gallons (2½ hours of fuel). Enclosure (50).
(c) No emergency condition existed necessitating an immediate landing. Enclosure (50).
(d) LT HORTON, PPC was piloting the aircraft from the right side (co-pilot's position). Enclosure (50).
(e) LT HORTON was giving PPC check to LT G. ELLIS during this flight.
(f) LT HORTON was qualified for a special instrument rating and in the last three (3) months made five (5) simulated but no actual GCA approaches.
(g) This was the first GCA approach made by LT HORTON to NS, Argentia within the last twelve month period.
(h) All emergency instructions issued by GCA were acknowledged as understood by the pilot. Enclosure (7).
(i) Crosswind was from the left during this approach.
(j) GCA final controller declared a no gyro approach during the final and critical phase of the run when the aircraft did not respond to directional corrections. Enclosure (7).
(k) The aircraft made a left turn without instructions from GCA, to correct to the center of the runway. Enclosure (7).
(l) GCA elevation operator observed the aircraft drop slightly below glide path, and immediately thereafter disappeared into the ground return. Enclosure (8).
(m) A GCA approach made under similar weather conditions one hour previous to fatal incident was considered satisfactory and normal. Enclosure (51).
(n) The elevated road-bed caused the loss of the port mount, the number one propellor, and removed part of the port flap.
(o) Weight and balance was within limits for landing. Enclosure (52).
(p) No malfunctions or material failures were indicated prior to the initial impact. Enclosure (50).
(q) Power was added after initial impact. Enclosure (53).

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UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLIGHT
AIR FORCE
PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, FLEET POST OFFICE, NEW YORK, N.Y.

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REF ID: A6511

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

(32.) In analyzing this accident the primary accident factor is considered to be pilot error, weather and an airport hazard were contributing factors. The pilot erred by descending below GCA minimums without visually sighting the runway and did not gain contact until the aircraft was dangerously low, Enclosure (54). This fact is evidenced in the statement of the GCA elevation operator and the transcription of the GCA final approach, Enclosure (7) and (8). The elevation operator observed the aircraft drop below the glide path and merge with the ground return short of the runway. The final controller observed the aircraft make a left turn at this position even though he had not issued instructions for this maneuver. The pilot had taken over visually and sighting the runway to the left commenced the banking turn to the port and during this bank nosed over slightly. The pilot was controlling the aircraft from the right seat and was making a left turn. The radio compass, the braces in the windshield, and the nose section were in his line of sight. These cockpit obstructions, the reduced visibility, and moisture on the windshield impaired the pilots vision so much that he was unable to accurately determine the altitude of the aircraft resulting in the initial collision. This impact 548 feet short of runway 25 caused the loss of the port mount, the number one propellor, and shortly thereafter a portion of the port flap. Realizing the aircraft had collided with the ground short of the runway, the pilot added power to correct onto the runway. The application of power aggravated the situation causing the starboard wing to rise, the port wing to drag on the ground, and the aircraft to make a steep banking turn to port. The pilot then cut all power with the crash bar switch, Enclosure (50) and (55). By this time the aircraft was slightly inverted and collided nose first with the ground.

The weather at the time of the accident was zero ceiling obscured and the visibility one-eighth of a mile in fog. The low ceiling and reduced visibility interfered with the pilots' vision to such an extent that when he became contact the aircraft was dangerously low. A pilot making a GCA run one hour prior to the accident reported that moisture on the windshield had made landing more difficult by affecting his depth perception, Enclosure (51). Since the fog had intensified, this moisture was still present. The fog and the moisture on the windshield interfered with the pilots' vision to such a degree that he could not accurately determine the height of the aircraft and collided with the ground.

~~RESTRICTED~~

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The raised roadbed at the initial impact point caused considerable damage to the aircraft. When the plane collided with the embankment the number one propeller, the port mount, and the port flap were removed. Due to the damage rendered by this impact the aircraft was without sufficient control to recover upon the addition of power by the pilot. The thrust developed by the starboard engines was considerably greater than the thrust developed by the port engine and the removal of the port flap resulted in a loss of lift to the port wing. With greater thrust being produced on the starboard side and the loss of lift to the port wing the aircraft made an increasing banking turn to the left scraping the portwing and continuing on over to a slightly inverted position. The aircraft being slightly inverted when the power was cut struck the ground in a nose low position. Forward momentum carried the aircraft over whereupon it collided with the ground in an upright position, then separated into three major sections, Enclosure (39).

Shoulder harnesses were worn only by the pilot and co-pilot, both fatalities. Although the forces were tremendous in this accident, the pilot was found in his seat with the shoulder harness intact. (b) (6)

(b) (6)

A special safety feature of the B4Y is a ditching platform above the hatch connecting the bomb bay with the after-station. The single crew member in this location at the time of the impact sustained fatal injuries. It is not known if he was braced against the canvas sling at the rear of this platform, Enclosure (79).

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY FOUR
NAVY #103, FLEET POST OFFICE, NEW YORK, N.Y.

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

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- (33.) It is the conclusion of the aircraft accident board that LT HORTON was well qualified as a Patrol Plane Commander in P4Y-2B type aircraft. LT HORTON was a member of the squadron instrument board and was considered a very competent instrument pilot. It is the opinion of this board that the primary cause of this accident was pilot error and that secondary causes were weather and an airport hazard.
- (a) LT HORTON erred as follows:
1. By attempting to land at N.S. Argentia under weather conditions below GCA minimums when no emergency existed and when adequate fuel and good alternates were available.
 2. By not taking a wave-off when reaching GCA minimums even though he did not have the runway in sight.
 3. By attempting to make a difficult approach and landing while controlling the aircraft from the co-pilot's position.
 4. By descending below the glide path at a critical altitude when sighting the runway.
 5. By applying power after initial impact and further aggravating the unbalanced condition of the aircraft.
- (b) Although GCA is capable of bringing aircraft down to "touch" under good receiving conditions, the gear has its limitations. Altitude and time are so critical below GCA minimums that these limits should be exceeded only in an emergency. The pilot when he finally did establish contact dropped below glide path and into ground return on the elevation scope before the man tracking him with his cursor could transmit this information to the final controller.
- (c) It is also the conclusion of this board that the damage sustained by the aircraft in striking the embankment 548 feet short of runway 25 was sufficient to cause the pilot to lose control upon the addition of power.
- (d) The recommendations of the aircraft accident board are as follows:
1. GCA minimums be observed except in actual emergency.
 2. (b)(5)
 3. GCA eliminate no gyro approaches for aircraft when making approaches below GCA minimums except in emergency conditions (no gyro approaches do not permit the pilot to "rudder" small corrections).
 4. Approach lights should be extended to a much greater distance from the end of the runway.

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5. Crew should be at ditching stations during actual GCA approaches.
6. Shoulder harnesses be provided for all seats, wherever practical, in the P4Y.

ORIGINAL

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, G/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6) 401, USN, (b) (6) concerning crash of NY Bu.
No. 59988

I, (b) (6), was on duty as approach controller, when VHF contact was first established with 59988 on 126.18 MCS, at approximately 2320 local time. 59988 reported to approach control that he was 35 miles out at 2000 feet. I then issued a clearance to the aircraft to maintain 2000 feet to the Argentin range station and to report when over the range station. I then gave the aircraft current Argentin weather which at the time of contact was indefinite 100 feet obscured 1/4 mile visibility in fog, wind SSW 5 knots allimeter 040 and also advised the aircraft GCA would be standing by, and that his GCA frequency would be Navy channel 47 frequency 142.1MCS, and not to switch to that frequency until advised by approach control. GCA was then notified by telephone of the inbound aircraft. A short while later 2330 approximately, my relief arrived and the information was being passed to relieve the watch. At approximately 2335 59988 requested GCA to transmit on VHF frequency 14202 and 3105 MCS. He advised he was having VHF trouble and wanted an HF frequency as an alternate in case of VHF failure. I recorded for the message and advised GCA of the request and GCA wilcoed. At approximately 2339 GCA advised they had a target 1 mile south of the range station and that they would accept the aircraft on heading of 325 magnetic. At that time I was relieved, at approximately 2341 the aircraft reported over the range station and was instructed to switch to his GCA frequency and take up a heading of 325° magnetic and contact GCA at this I left the tower.

Proceeding to barracks 40, drawing my section off, I was behind barracks 4 at approximately 2356 when I hear a muffled explosion (whoosh). I stopped my car and observed two small fires that appeared to be 800 feet in from the approach end of the runway 25. Then hearing truck's in the vicinity of the fires I realized there must have been a crash and proceeded to the flight control tower with my section to assist the personnel at the tower. I received the information of the crash and assisted with my section to carry out the crash procedure.

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (1)

REF ID: A65129
SECURITY INFORMATION

795 22

PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6), G1 concerning crash of P4Y Bu. No. 59988

At approximately 2330 local my section (3) arrived in the tower building. Approximately ten minutes later all information had been passed to my section by section 2. At that time I assumed the watch. At 2341, Navy 9988 reported over the Argentia range station (NRP), and was advised to set up a holding pattern on the south leg of the range. At 2342, GCA advised that they had radar contact with the aircraft. I advised 9988 to turn to a heading of 325 degrees magnetic, and contact Argentia GCA on Navy Channel seven. At that time one of the men from the relieved watch switched the spare transceiver (arc-1) to channel seven to monitor the GCA approach. At 2343 GCA advised that radio and radar contact had been definitely established with the aircraft. Immediately thereafter I placed the crash crew on standby position one. During the GCA approach exclusive of the final the tower constantly monitored the approach frequency. Just before the aircraft turned final I placed the crash crew in standby position two. Then GCA advised the aircraft was on final I advised them to report when the aircraft was three miles out. Upon the report three miles, GCA was advised that the aircraft was cleared for the approach. During the last portion of the approach I was not able to monitor continuously. The air OP's duty officer and myself were in the doorway of the tower attempting to hear the aircraft on final. I heard the aircraft's engines surge, as if the pilot were applying power for a wave off, then immediately following there was a loss of power. I returned immediately to the control position near the crash phone. I believed for a very short time that the aircraft had possibly commenced a wave off then sighted the runway and cut power to land. However I neither heard nor saw anymore of the aircraft. I heard GCA attempting to contact the aircraft via radio. It was approximately thirty seconds after I heard the loss of power that I sounded the crash phone and alarm. Time 2358. I reported over the phone that a P4Y was suspected to have crashed in grid area dog-7. Repeated several times. Due to the fact that at no time did I have the aircraft in sight, and due to the close proximity of the water to the approach end of runway 25, I dispatched the crash boats. The other man in the tower, (b) (6) ACAN, dispatched the standby crash truck by radio to the approximate scene. After being definitely assured by the crash trucks that the aircraft was on the field, I secured the crash boat to the boat house. The dispensary was advised to dispatch more ambulances at approximately 0010. Thereafter routine procedures were carried out.

I was able at all times to hear the crash equipment on the assigned crash frequency, however no two way contact could be established with any of the equipment other than GCA, the boat house, and the crash boat.

The weather at the time of the crash was an indefinite ceiling obscured, 1/8 mile visibility, surface winds light and variable, indicated south south west at five knots, the altimeter setting 30.38. This information was relayed to aircraft by GCA.

(b) (6)

SECURITY INFORMATION

U. S. FLEET WEATHER CENTRAL
NAVY NO. 103, FLEET "OSM" OFFICE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

9 OCTOBER 1952

Weather at time of crash of Navy No. 59988, P4Y, Squadron VP-24.

The synoptic situation at the time of the crash, taken from the 070030Z Weather Chart, shows the station under a South South Westerly flow of wind on the receding side of a small high pressure area centered 200 miles east of Nfld. A very weak cold front through the Gulf of St. Lawrence and along the east coast of the United States.

Forecast Weather for ETA	Weather at FTA	Weather at 0230Z	Weather at 0330Z	Weather projected to ATA at Alternates
ARGENTIA AR: 2X3/4F 0445Z	1X1F 0445Z	1X1/4F 0230Z	0X1/8F 0330Z	0X1/8F 0328Z
TORBAY VT: Clear 15 0515Z	Clear 15 0515Z	Clear 15 0230Z	Clear 15 0330Z	Clear 15 0400Z
HARMON JT: 200100010 0615Z	Clear 10 0615Z	Clear 7 0230Z	Clear 7 0330Z	80010 0500Z
GANDER QY: Clear 15 0520Z	20°F 0520Z	Clear 10 0230Z	Clear 10 0330Z	Clear 10 0405Z
SIDNEY CY: 100015 0615Z	304F 0645Z	201F 0200Z	306F 0350	0X1/4F 0530Z

Actual time of arrival was 1 plus 17 earlier than ETA.

ETA AR: 0445Z ATA AR: 0328Z

Projected ATA for Alternates computed at 140 knots T.A.S.

&

ATA

Observation taken three minutes prior to the time of the crash.

Ceiling: Indefinite Zero Obscured.

Visibility: One eight mile in Fog.

Air Pressure at Sea Level: 1020.2 mbs.

Air Temperature: 50°F

Dew Point: 50°F

Relative Humidity: 100%

Surface Wind: Southsouthwest 5 Knots

Altimeter setting: 30.38 in.

(b) (6)

Prepared by:

Aero (b) (6)

USM

Enclosure 13)

79-24

PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6) AGAM, USN concerning crash of P4Y Bu. No. 59988

At approximately 2340 local, we (Sect. 3) relieved Section 2 of the duty in the control tower. I took over the duty as "A" stand operator at about that time, and since there was no VFR or ground traffic, I was unoccupied. The other people present in the tower were the duty officer, (b) (6), Lt, USN, (b) (6) A01 the section leader and (b) (6) AGAM the weather observer.

The aircraft (59988) was in the process of going into GCA control, and we were monitoring GCA and the plane on Channel 7 on our ARC I gear.

At 2351, I received a new weather observation from Aerology which gave an indefinite zero obscured ceiling, visibility 1/8 mile with fog, surface winds south by southwest at 5 knots, altimeter setting 30.38. This information was passed immediately to GCA on channel 3 by (b) (6) and I logged it as the 0000 observation.

The GCA run, as I heard it, was standard, with no major differences from any other run. The plane turned final to runway 25 at 8 miles and GCA advised the tower of this. (b) (6) "rogered" the transmission and told GCA to check with us when the plane was at 3 miles. A few minutes later, GCA advised the tower that the plane was 3 miles from end of runway, and since (b) (6) was busy at something else, I "rogered" for the message and advised GCA that his aircraft was cleared to land. I waited for a moment and since GCA didn't acknowledge, I repeated the transmission and asked for a "roger" for it. GCA immediately did so.

Suddenly GCA advised the plane that he appeared to be taking a wave off and almost at the same time I heard a loud roar of engines. The roar lasted a second or less, and since I was trying to hear the sounds of a crash, my attention was drawn away from the speaker broadcasting the run. When I heard neither the sound of a crash nor the plane going overhead on the wave off I again continued listening to GCA and watching for any signs of fire and listening for any explosions. GCA was then calling the plane and advising that they lost radar contact with him and couldn't pick him up anywhere. (b) (6) waited a moment, then checked to see if GCA had contact with the plane yet, and when he received a negative answer, he hit the crash button. The time was 2358 local.

While he was on the crash phone I contacted the CO2 truck (which was on standby in position on runway 25) and advised them to proceed to runway 25 (approach end) for suspected crash. I logged the time on a piece of paper in the tower and went back to giving directions and information to the CO2 truck. I later learned that they only heard my first transmission and lost radio contact after that.

Then, GCA called the tower on 6390 KCS and sent the following information: The plane was on 1/4 mile final when he planned to take a wave off. They lost radio/radar contact with the plane and couldn't pick him up again.

At no time did we have the plane in sight nor were we positive the plane had crashed until the CO2 truck reported he was at the scene of the crash which had two fires burning and needed assistance badly.

(b) (6)

PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, G/O FFO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6) ACAN, USN (b) (6) concerning crash of
P4Y aircraft Bu. No. 59988:

While on duty in Argentia tower as "A" stand operator on the night of 6 October 1952, first heard Navy 59988 contacting Argentia approach control at approximately 2325 Lcl. He gave his position as 35 miles out and at an altitude of 2000 ft. He was given a clearance by approach control to maintain 2000 ft. to the Argentia Range station. He acknowledged this and was then given his GCA frequency and told to report over the range station. I was relieved of watch at approximately 2335. At about 2339 GCA advised they had 59988 on their scopes. 59988 was then advised to switch to GCA frequency. At this time I left the tower. At no time did I as "A" stand operator have contact with 59988. While enroute to the barracks I heard a loud noise that I thought may have been a crash. When stopping to see what had happened I saw flames near the runway and then proceeded to the tower to assist as needed

Certified True Copy
Kob.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

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GCA

CALL ARGENTIA GCA
REQUEST GCA THROUGH NAVY ARGENTIA TOWER

ARGENTIA, NFLD.
NS ARGENTIA, 51'

TIME OF OPERATION STANDBY UN 10 MINUTES NOTICE AT ALL TIMES. CHECK OUT AND TRAINING FLIGHTS TO BE ARRANGED LOCALLY.
REGULAR GCA FREQUENCIES: 3105 3195 3295 3475 4220 4265 4495 4890 6210 6290 6390 6640 6970 8210
118.1 126.18 132.3 134.1 134.64 135.9 137.7 137.88 142.02 142.74 143.64

EMERGENCY: 323 121.5

ON REQUEST: (Receives 190-550, 1500-9000)

MINIMUMS DAY 200-1/2 NIGHT 200-1/2 | GLIDE ANGLE 3° DESCENDS 277' PER MILE

**MAINTAINING ALTITUDES**

Maintain altitudes and courses assigned by controlling center until within range of and cleared to GCA.

ORIENTATION

GCA may require orientation procedure in case straight-in approach is not practical. This procedure may be varied, if necessary, by GCA controller for any one approach. In general it will follow usual pattern of downwind, base, and final legs, as diagrammed, at following altitudes: downwindleg, 1500 feet, base leg, 1500 feet, final approach until glide path is reached, 1500 feet.

PULL UP

On all runways the wave-off course to be ordered will direct the aircraft to fly to seaward at an altitude of 1500'.

COMMUNICATION FAILURE

If for any one (1) minute interval (5 seconds nominal) no communication is received from GCA, climb immediately to two thousand (2000) feet, proceed to Argentia Range (NWP), 323 Kc., and hold on the West leg between the range and a point four (4) minutes outbound. Attempt to re-establish communications with Argentina GCA or Tower.

ADDITIONAL RADIO

NAVY ARGENTIA RADIO (NWP)

NAVY ARGENTIA TOWER

NAVY ARGENTIA (Localizer) APN

NAVY ARGENTIA APPROACH CONTROL

TRANSMITS

323 121.5 126.18 132.3 142.74

323 338 4495 121.5 126.18 132.3 142.74

338

126.18 (primary) 142.74 (secondary)

4495 121.5 135.9

GUARDS

3105 4495 121.5 126.18 132.3 142.74

3105 4495 121.5 126.18 132.3 142.74

Use Tower Frequencies

126.18 (primary) 142.74 (secondary) 4495

121.5 135.9

INSTRUMENT RUNWAY

TOTAL RUNWAY LENGTH

TOUCHDOWN POINT FROM END

25 OTHER GCA RUNWAYS

6000'

500'

7

6000'

500'

17

5800'

500'

30

5100'

450'

TRANSCRIPT OF GCA APPROACH FOR P4Y-2B 59988 AT NAVAL STATION ARGENTIA, 6 OCTOBER 1952, AS TRANSCRIBED FROM TAPE RECORDING.

9988 REPORTED HEADING AT 325 AT 2,000 FEET. ARGENTIA GCA ROGERED AND TOLD HIM TO TURN TO 330 AND HOLD 2,000 FEET.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. IF YOU RECEIVE NO TRANSMISSION FOR A PERIOD OF ONE MINUTE WHILE IN THE TRAFFIC PATTERN OR FOR FIVE SECONDS WHILE ON FINAL APPROACH YOU WILL ASSUME COMMUNICATION FAILURE, CLIMB ON YOUR LAST AS FIVE HEADING TO ALTITUDE OF 2,000 FEET, PROCEED TO THE NAV WILLIAM PETER RANGE STATION, HOLD ON THE SOUTH LEG AND ATTEMPT TO REESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH EITHER ARGENTIA TOWER, ARGENTIA APPROACH CONTROL OR ARGENTIA GCA. ACKNOWLEDGE WITH WILCO IF UNDERSTOOD.

THIS IS 9988. WILCO.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. REQUEST PILOTS NAME, ACTIVITY TO WHICH ATTACHED, AND AIR SPEED ON FINAL APPROACH.

ARGENTIA GCA THIS IS 9988. TYPE AIRCRAFT PETER FOUR VOKE, PILOTS NAME IS HORTON, ACTIVITY TO WHICH ATTACHED VICTOR PETER TWENTY FOUR, AIR SPEED ON FINAL APPROACH ONE ONE SEVEN KNOTS. OVER.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. ROGER. UNDERSTAND PETER FOUR VOKE. PILOTS NAME HORTON. I STILL HOW OBOZ ROGER TWO OBOZ NAV. ACTIVITY TO WHICH ATTACHED VICTOR PETER TWO FOUR. SPEED ON FINAL APPROACH ONE ONE SEVEN KNOTS.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. TURN RIGHT TO HEADING 040. MAINTAIN 2,000 FEET. OVER.

THIS IS 9988. TURNING RIGHT TO HEADING 040. MAINTAINING 2,000 FEET. OVER.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. WEATHER AT ARGENTIA 100 FEET OBSCURED, ONE QUARTER MILE VISIBILITY WITH FOG. OVER.

9988. WEATHER AT ARGENTIA 100 FEET OBSCURED, ONE QUARTER MILE VISIBILITY WITH FOG.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. SURFACE WINDS AT ARGENTIA SOUTH SOUTHWEST FIVE. OVER.

9988. SURFACE WINDS AT ARGENTIA SOUTH SOUTHWEST FIVE.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. THE CURRENT ALTIMETER SETTING 3040. OVER.

9988. ROGER. CURRENT ALTIMETER SETTING 3040.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. TURN FURTHER RIGHT NOW TO A HEADING 070. MAINTAIN AT 2,000 FEET.

THIS IS 9988. TURNING RIGHT HEADING 070, 2,000 FEET. OVER.

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9988 ARGENTIA GCA. CHECK AND ALIGN WITH MAGNETIC COMPASS WHEN STEADY 070. DO NOT RESET FOR THE ROLL INVER OF THIS APPROACH.

THIS IS 9988. CHECK AND GYRO WITH MAGNETIC COMPSS. WILL NOT RESET.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. PERFORM YOUR LANDING COCKPIT CHECK. OVER.

THIS IS 9988. ROGER. PERFORMING COCKPIT CHECK.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. TURN LEFT HEADING 060. YOU HAVE A SLIGHT RIGHT HAND DRIFT. OVER.

9988. TURNING LEFT HEADING 060.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. YOUR POSITION NOW 4 MILES NORTHEAST.

9988. FOUR MILES NORTH OF FIELD DOWNWIND LEG.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. YOUR NEW WEATHER INDEFINATE, ZERO OBSCURED, ONE EIGHT MILE WITH FOG. OVER.

9988. ROGER. INDEFINATE, ZERO OBSCURED, ONE EIGHTY MILE WITH FOG. OVER.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. FIELD ELEVATION FIVE ONE. OVER.

9988. UNDERSTAND FIELD ELEVATION FIVE ONE. OVER.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. THIS APPROACH IS TO RUNWAY TWO FIVE. DUTY RUNWAY TWO FIVE. OVER.

9988. UNDERSTAND THIS APPROACH.....

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. PUBLISHED MINIMUMS 200 FEET AND OUT HALF MILE. OVER.

9988. UNDERSTAND PUBLISHED MINIMUMS 200 FEET ONE HALF MILE. OVER.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. IN THE EVENT A WAVE-OFF IS GIVEN ON FINAL MAKE A CLIMBING RIGHT TURN TO A HEADING OF 320. CLIMB TO 2,000 FEET, AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS OF GCA.

9988. IN THE EVENT A WAVE-OFF IS GIVEN ON FINAL MAKE A CLIMBING RIGHT TURN TO HEADING 320. CLIMB TO 2,000 FEET, AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS OF GCA.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. THAT IS CORRECT. TURN TO A HEADING OF 160. DESCEND TO AND MAINTAIN 1,500 FEET.

9988. TURN RIGHT TO A HEADING OF 160. DESCEND TO AND MAINTAIN 1,500 FEET.

9988 ARGENTIA GCA. YOU ARE TURNING NOW TO YOUR BASE LEG MAKING A RIGHT-HAND APPROACH TO RUNWAY TWO FIVE.

Enclosure (7)

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9988. TURNING NOW TO B SET LEG MAKING A RIGHT-HAND APPROACH
TO RUNWAY TWO FIVE.

9988 ARGENTINA GCA. YOUR ALTIMETER SETTING 3038.

9988. ALTIMETER SETTING 3038.

9988 ARGENTINA GCA. CONTINUE YOUR RIGHT TURN TO A HEADING OF
170.

9988. CONTINUE RIGHT TURN TO A HEADING OF 170.

9988 ARGENTINA GCA. REDUCE TO APPROACH AIR SPEED.

9988. REDUCE TO APPROACH AIR SPEED.

9988 ARGENTINA GCA. RUNWAY TWO FIVE IS 6,000 FEET LONG, 300
FEET WIDE, TOUCHDOWN POINT 500 FEET FROM END OF RUNWAY.

9988. RUNWAY TWO FIVE IS 6,000 FEET LONG, 300 FEET... 300
FEET WIDE, TOUCHDOWN POINT 500 FEET FROM END OF RUNWAY.

9988 ARGENTINA GCA. I SAY AG. IN. RUNWAY WIDTH 300 FEET. TURN
RIGHT NOW TO A HEADING 250. MAINTAIN 1,500 FEET.

9988. TURN RIGHT TO A HEADING 250. MAINTAIN 1500 FEET.

9988 ARGENTINA GCA. YOUR FINAL CONTROLLER. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE
THE APPROACH END OF RUNWAY IN SIGHT UPON REACHING GCA MINIMUMS,
YOU WILL EXECUTE AN EMERGENCY FULL-UP AND CARRY OUT EMERGENCY
INSTRUCTIONS AS PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED. ACKNOWLEDGE WILCO IF
UNDERSTOOD.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

9988. WILCO YOUR EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS.

9988. ARGENTINA GCA. YOU ARE TURNING ON TO FINAL NOW. EIGHT MILES
FROM END OF RUNWAY. DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
YOU ARE ASSIGNED HEADING TO FLY 250. ALTITUDE 1,500 FEET. TURN
LEFT HEADING 240. CHECK AND ALIGN YOUR GYRO COMPASS, AND DO
NOT RESET. YOU HAD AN EARLY TURN. YOU'RE IN A RIGHT-HAND DRIFT.
240 YOUR HEADING. YOUR DISTANCE FROM END OF RUNWAY IS 7 MILES.
RIGHT TURN HOLDING 243. 243 YOUR HEADING NOW. YOUR ALTITUDE REMAINS
1,500 FEET. CONTINUE RIGHT 245. 245 IS YOUR HEADING. YOU ARE NOW
APPROACHING GLIDE PATH. COMMENCE STANDARD RATE OF DESCENT AT
APPROXIMATELY 500 FEET PER MINUTE. YOU ARE 125 FEET BELOW GLIDE
PATH NOW, DISTANCE FROM END OF RUNWAY 6 MILES. 100 FEET BELOW,
COME UP SLOWLY. 75 NOV 50. TURN RIGHT 250. 40. 30, 20, 10, AND
ON GLIDE PATH. ADJUST YOUR RATE OF DESCENT. 250 YOUR NEW ASSIGNED
HEADING, ON GLIDE PATH AND HOLDING. ON GLIDE PATH 250 YOUR
ASSIGNED HEADING. ON GLIDE PATH AND HOLDING. GOING BELOW. 10
FEET BELOW NOW. YOUR DISTANCE FROM END OF RUNWAY 5 MILES. 10
FEET BELOW THE GLIDE PATH. 250 HEADING. TURN RIGHT ON 253. YOU'RE
ON GLIDE PATH NOW. SURFACE WINDS ARE REPORTED SOUTH SOUTHWEST AT
FIVE. CLEARED FOR CONTINUATION OF THIS APPROACH. ON GLIDE PATH AND
HOLDING. 253 IS YOUR HEADING. YOU'RE ON GLIDE PATH. YOUR DISTANCE
FROM THE END OF THE RUNWAY NOW 4 MILES. 253 YOUR HEADING. YOU'RE
GOING ABOVE THE GLIDE PATH. 10 FEET ABOVE. NOW 20, 20 FEET ABOVE.

795 30

TURN LEFT HEADING 251. 20 FEET ABOVE. 251 YOUR HEADING. YOUR DISTANCE FROM END OF RUNWAY 3 MILES. 10 FEET NOW AND ON GLIDE PATH. 251 YOUR HEADING. CHECK LANDING GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED. FLAPS AND PROPS AS YOU DESIRE. ON GLIDE PATH 251 YOUR ASSIGNED HEADING. ON GLIDE PATH AND EXCELLENT RATE OF DESCENT. NOW TWO AND ONE HALF MILES FROM END OF RUNWAY. YOU'RE ON GLIDE PATH. ON GLIDE PATH AND HOLDING VERY NICELY. TURN LEFT HEADING 248. YOU'RE ON GLIDE PATH 248 YOUR NEW ASSIGNED HEADING. ON GLIDE PATH. YOU'RE NOW 2 MILES FROM END OF RUNWAY. YOU HAVE BEEN CLEARED FOR TOUCHDOWN ON THIS APPROACH. ON GLIDE PATH 248 YOUR HEADING. TURN LEFT HEADING 245. ON GLIDE PATH NOW 10, 20 FEET BELOW. NOW 30, 40, 50 FEET BELOW. BRING IT UP PLEASE. ONE AND ONE HALF MILE FROM END OF RUNWAY. COMING UP NOW. TURN LEFT HEADING 240. COMING UP NOW 40 FEET LOW. 240 YOUR HEADING. 30, 20 AND ON GLIDE PATH AND HOLDING. DISREGARD YOUR GYRO AND TURN LEFT. 1 MILE FROM END OF RUNWAY. 50 FEET ABOVE GLIDE PATH. STOP YOUR TURN. 50 FEET ABOVE GLIDE PATH. STOP YOUR TURN. 50 FEET ABOVE. 50 FEET ABOVE GLIDE PATH. TURN RIGHT. TURN RIGHT. 50 FEET ABOVE NOW. STOP YOUR TURN. ONE-HALF MILE GCA MINIMUMS. DROPPING IN ON GLIDE PATH. TURN LEFT TURN LEFT. YOU'RE ON GLIDE PATH STOP YOUR TURN. ON GLIDE PATH AND HOLDING. RUNWAY CENTERLINE TO YOUR RIGHT. YOU'RE DRIFTING RIGHT RAPIDLY. NOW YOU'RE TURNING TO THE LEFT AND ON COURSE AND ON GLIDE PATH. 9988 FROM THE APPEARANCE OF YOUR ATTITUDE OF FLIGHT YOU TOOK A WAVEOFF ON THE FINAL. GCA STANDING BY. 9988 GCA. 9988 ARGENTIA GCA DO YOU READ ME? OUTSIDE. LOOK AROUND FOR HIM. I DON'T SEE HIM OUT HERE. HE SPUN IN I THINK. 9988 NAVY 9988 GCA DO YOU READ ME?

795 31

~~RESTRICTED~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6) AC3, USN, (b) (6) concerning crash of B4Y
Bu. No. 59988.

Position: Elevation (GCA)

He turned on final about eight and one-half miles from end of runway. Hit glidepath approximately five and three-quarter miles from end of runway. He came up on glidepath slowly and steadily. He didn't deviate more than ten or twenty feet (which is normal) until about one and one half miles from end of runway. At said position he dropped fifty feet below and recovered at one mile, where approach controller advised aircraft to disregard gyro and continue a no gyro approach. The controller gave him approximately two no gyro corrections. At GCA minimums ($\frac{1}{2}$ mile) aircraft was notified he was at GCA minimums. He was on glidepath and drifting right. The next transmission was on glidepath on course. From my scope he appeared slightly high at a half mile, then he was on glidepath and holding until just less than a quarter of a mile where he appeared to go below slightly. (I did not lower my cursor, because he disappeared into ground return immediately after.) The ground return at this point is starting to get "grassy" which is to say it bounces out to merge with any target it comes into contact with. The target at this point is approximately a quarter to half inch in length. To turn down the gain to decrease the target would result in losing both target and ground return. From my position his going slightly below at this point did not seem unusual. It looked like he had seen the approach lights and was dropping toward them as I had seen many pilots do before on the same runway and in the same weather. The target disappeared into the ground return around the overend of the runway reflector. I saw the target again between the touchdown and overend. It was in a sharp pulling up attitude. I then told the controller he appeared to be taking a wave off.

I have been in the GCA program since September of 1950. I was graduated from school as a qualified azimuth operator. When the field change came out in 1951 for the controller to control from the azimuth position, I checked out in the elevation position. That was approximately eighteen months ago. I have been operating the elevation position at this unit since October 6, 1951.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

795 32

STATEMENT

Aircraft was turned final and over to me as final controller by ACC MV Chase distance from end of runway approx. 8 1/4 mi. First transmission "If you do not have approach end of runway in sight on reaching GCA minimums execute an emergency pull up and carry out emergency instructions as previously outlined. Acknowledge with Wilco if understood". Pilot rogered for transmission with Wilco understood or words to that effect. I then told pilot he was on final 8 miles from end of runway and not to acknowledge any further transmissions. Assigned heading 250° at 1500 feet heading changed to 240° at 1500 to check drift. Corrections were given as needed to bring aircraft to center line. Aircraft started up to glide path at approximately (7) miles and was on glide path at approximately five and threequarter miles. Pilot held good glide path until approximately 1½ miles, then went 50 feet low. This information was instantly relayed to and he corrected to glide path by the time he reached 1 mile; during this time the aircraft was drifting right and correction failed to bring him back. I told pilot to disregard gyro and turn left, this he did. I told him to stop turn, this also was done. Then he was told to turn right, which he did. Approximately 2 or 3 no gyro corrections were given. At 1 mile pilot was informed he was at GCA minimums. Immediately after this pilot was told runway center line was to his right, drifting right now. Now on course on glide path. At this time plane assumed an unnatural attitude and was so informed (looked like a possible wave-off). We then attempted to control aircraft to no avail. All transmission were standard GCA. 3 miles check wheels down and locked, props and flaps as desired. 2 miles cleared for touchdown on this approach. The unnatural attitude of aircraft was noted as a left turn out.

Completed school April 1951. Sent to GCA Unit #4 at San Diego Calif. Operated as Approach Controller with this Unit until transferred to Unit #15, Argentia, N'fld in early November 1951, primary position Approach Controller. I am and have been checked out in all positions (operating) since July 1951.

~~RESTRICTED~~

(b) (6) [REDACTED]
(b) (6) VCI
GCA Final Approach Controller

SECURITY INFORMATION

795 33

Enclosure (2)

PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6) IM, USA, file no. (b) (6) concerning crash of P4Y aircraft Bu. No. 59988.

On 6 October 1952 I was GCA Duty Officer. At approximately 2330 I was alerted that an IFR approach was being made. Upon my arrival at the GCA trailer I found the trailer manned by the duty crew and preparing for a GCA approach of a P4Y aircraft Bu. No. 59988.

I watched the tune-up of the equipment and the check-off. All checks indicated equipment to be tuned up properly and normal. The aircraft was taken under GCA control at 2344 and the approach was started. The weather was given to the pilot at that time as 100 ft. ceiling and $\frac{1}{4}$ mile fog. The start of the approach was normal in all respects. Before the aircraft was turned on final approach a new weather condition was received from the tower and was immediately passed on to the pilot. This new weather was given as SSW 5 zero and $\frac{1}{8}$ mile fog observed. After the aircraft was turned on final approach, I left the trailer and went outside with the outside observer. Visibility at that time had not got any better than when last reported to the pilot of the aircraft.

As the aircraft was continuing his approach, the outside observer and myself kept a sharp lookout to see when he broke contact. All of a sudden I heard a sound of motors as though full power had been applied and then complete silence. A sound of a crash was heard by me. However, not hearing the motors of the aircraft, the outside observer reported immediately to the approach controller that he believed the aircraft had crashed. At no time did I hear any noise other than the motors as mentioned before. At no time did I see the aircraft that crashed.

I followed the first crash vehicles down to the scene of the crash. The crash crew had extinguished any fires by the time I had arrived and were searching for survivors. Feeling that the crash crew had everything pretty well under control and noting that the ambulances had not arrived, I returned to the GCA trailer to see what was holding up the ambulances, and, if necessary to direct them to the scene of the crash. Weather conditions had not improved. Upon arrival at the trailer I saw the ambulances going to the scene of the crash. I then returned to the scene of the crash to see whether I could be of any assistance. I was not needed so I returned to the GCA trailer.

(b) (6)

SECURITY INFORMATION

695-34

CONTROL SQUADRON TWENTY FOUR
NAVY #105, FLEET POST OFFICE, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6), USA concerning the crash of P4Y Bu.No.
59988

Before the aircraft was turned over to GCA we were advised by the tower that the aircraft 59988 desired us to transmit simultaneously on channel seven (7) VHF 142.02 mcs. and 3105 kc. The aircraft at that time reported holding on the south course of N.W.R. range. I advised the tower we would then take him. Tower advised 59988 to take up a heading of 325° M at 2000 ft and switch to GCA frequency.

I picked up the aircraft making a rt. turn about 4 miles south of the field, and advised him to continue his turn to a heading of 340° as soon as the pilot acknowledged this heading I gave him his last communications procedure.

When the aircraft reached a position approx. 3 miles west of the field I turned the aircraft to a heading of 040°. I continued the aircraft on this heading maintaining 2000 ft. throughout this portion of pattern. While the aircraft was going around the pattern I gave the pilot the field elevation (51 ft.), altimeter setting (3040), current weather (W.I.K & F), reminded the pilot to perform a landing cockpit check, and check and align gyro. When the aircraft reached a position approximately 3 miles north of the field I altered his course Rt. to a headlong of 070° continuing to hold his altitude at 2000 ft. When the pilot had been on this heading for about 1 mile I realized he was drifting Rt. rapidly enough so that his base leg would be extremely short so I again altered his heading 10° to the left to 060° at about this point new weather was given as Orl.6 Fog Alt. 3038. He maintained this heading until I turned him to his base leg approx. 9 miles NE of the field. At that time I assigned him a heading of 160° and descended him to 1500 ft. I informed him of GCA minimums (200 ft. 1/2 mile) gave him the runway dimensions (6000 ft. long 300 ft. wide TD point 500 ft beyond approach end of runway) all of which he acknowledged. I had also previously advised the aircraft that if a wave off was given on final approach he should make a climbing Rt turn out to a heading of 320° climb to 2000 ft. and await for further instructions.

While the aircraft was on base leg I advised the pilot to reduce to final approach airspeed and I then turned the aircraft to a heading of 250° to maintain 1500 ft. As soon as the approach controller took control of the aircraft I switched to (132.3mcs) the tower frequency for this approach and advised tower the aircraft then for the approach but advised me to check again at 3 miles. I remained on tower freq. then in the event tower should advise a wave off or in the event they should attempt to call us. When the aircraft reached approx. 3½ miles I again called tower for clearance and was advised the aircraft was cleared to land. I remained on tower freq. until the aircraft was approx. 3/4 a mile from end of runway at the time the aircraft was being reported on the glide path and on a heading approx. 230° or 235°. The final controller then advised the aircraft was passing GCA minimums and at almost the same instant to disregard his gyro he was then turned left told to stop and then turn rt. He was drifting rt. rapidly. Over end of RW on course on glide path then there was a pause of

WPS ON REQUEST INFORMATION

about 5 seconds. The transmission was made by the final controller that from the altitude of the aircraft was assumed the pilot was taking a W.O.

The tower then called us to ask if we still had ~~comm.~~^{mwl} with the aircraft. We called him several times receiving no answer. The tower was then advised that we did not. I immediately switched to 6390 kcs (crash freq.) and started acting as auxiliary tower for the control of crash equipment.

(b) (6)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

795 36

STATEMENT

1. Called tower for weather and aircraft information roger-for same.
2. Aircraft on downwind copied new weather.
3. Left trailer for observer when aircraft was ready for final turn.
4. Technician on phones relayed information aircraft $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from end of runway and successive ranges to half mile. Moment or so later heard engine roar then silence.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) AC1
Traffic Director GCA

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Enclosure (12)

PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, G/6 FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6) ET2, USN, (b) (6) concerning crash of P4Y Bu. No. 59988

After the plane turned final approach I went outside to become the outside observer. I listened to the majority of the final approach. As the plane neared the runway I watched for him in order to inform the Approach controller as to when he became contact. At no time did I ever see the plane. When the approach controller said over end of runway I heard the engines of the plane for the first time. It was a very loud roar (b) (5). A couple of seconds later the engine noise ceased abruptly and no more was heard at all. There was no flash or sound of any kind whatsoever after that.

(b) (6)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Exhibit 166



795 4



K-17747-1

68. 42





(21)





Excavation (20)


615 46

Env/assure (21)



CONTACTS MADE BY VARIOUS PARTS OF PLANE AT INITIAL IMPACT ALONG ROAD.

79 15 47



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Enclosure (22)

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SECURITY INFORMATION



Eldorado River (2)



EXHIBIT (24)

Enclosure (25)



III-51





7-10-67 (47)



795 53



Enclosure (24)

13-5

6AUC4030AE (30)





ENCLOSURE (31)



ENCL 10 SURVEY (32)





592 60



705 81



ENCL/ASURE (36)







SKETCH OF AIRCRAFT ATTITUDES BETWEEN SECOND IMPACT AND POINT OF
BREAKUP INTO THREE MAJOR SECTIONS



3



2



1

795 64



7



6



5



4

Inclosure (39)

ORIGINAL



ENCLOSURE (41)





ENCLOSURE (#2)



ENCLOSURE (43)






95 71



Enclosure (46)







(b) (6)

AD2

Final approach was normal prior to crash although Mr. Kotke and (b) (6) (b) (5) There had been some talk about going to Gander or Torbay although I'm not sure whether the pilot and co-pilot were in the discussion or talk among the personnel on the flight deck. I checked the fuel just prior to landing. We had a total of 750 gals. 600 gals. in wings and 150 gals. in bombays

Mr. Ellis was in the left hand seat and Mr. Norton was in the right. Mr. Norton repeated all of the GCA instructions and headings. But on final Mr. Norton had control of the aircraft. We received another weather report from GCA vis 1/8 ceiling 0 (not too sure) and asked pilot if he understood GCA minimums and he acknowledged. We had a great deal of corrections to make although the glidepath seemed to be satisfactory. We were told not to steer by Directional Gyro. I recall GCA saying turn right and I looked out of the plane capt's window and saw a yellow light just ahead of leading edge about 10 feet away. The left wing hit the deck then No. 1 engine. I placed myself against the bulkhead and sat in the jump seat facing aft. The lot added power to the engines then I think I heard Mr. Norton say "standby for crash and turn the crash bar off". The lights went out, we crashed and I lost consciousness.

When I regained consciousness I was in the forward part of the fuselage along side of the forward upper deck on my stomach. My first was fire and I crawled out on my stomach head first. I had difficulty as some debris had been piled on my right leg although I didn't have too much trouble.

The first person I saw was Mr. Norton and I shouted and shook him, but no response. The next person I encountered was (b) (6) who was partly buried up to his knees in debris, and I tried to pull him out with no success, he said he thought his jaw was broken. I was then approached by (b) (6) who had been in the after station and seconds later by (b) (6). The firemen had arrived in the meantime and consoled (b) (6) and (b) (6) and covered them with their coats.

(b) (6) told me someone was in the after station I went to the tail section and yelled and got a response from (b) (6), I could not help, I informed the firemen who were dousing the fire about (b) (6). The last person I saw was Mr. Kotke who was lying on the deck covered moaning. The ambulance arrived, took one stretcher patient, (b) (6) and myself rode in the front seat, we had trouble finding the main road due to the fog.

(b) (6)

695 75

Enclosure (50) _____

PATROL SQUADRON TWELVE-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FFO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of Lt(jg) (b) (6) USA

On 6 October 1952, I was returning from an operational flight to N. S. Argentia as PFC of P4Y-2B, Bureau Number 59772. About 2240 I was informed by Argentia tower that the present weather at Argentia was, ceiling 100 feet, visibility one-quarter of a mile with fog. Shortly thereafter the tower informed me that the present weather at Argentia was ceiling zero, visibility one-eighth of a mile with fog. It appeared as though the weather condition at this station was variable because of the fog, so I decided to make an attempt to land at my base before proceeding to my alternate. I requested GCA for my approach and was subsequently assigned a frequency for this control. The transaction from tower control to GCA was normal and commenced a normal approach. At approximately 150-200 feet the high intensity runway lights on the starboard side of the runway were sighted directly ahead of me. I corrected to port to the center of the runway but experienced difficulty in determining my exact altitude. The suddenness of the high intensity lighting upon breaking contact made everything surrounding them appear completely black. I made a slightly nose high position because of lack of depth perception at this moment and consequently touched down approximately 2500 feet from the approach end of the runway. At the completion of the roll out, I commenced a 180° turn to return to the taxiway and at this time noticed that the front pane of the windshield was covered with salt spray and moisture although I had wiped the window immediately in front of me one hour prior to landing. I felt that the salt and moisture which had collected on the windshield might have reflected the runway lights partially limiting my depth perception. I considered the GCA approach normal in all respects.

(b) (6)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

195 76

STATEMENT

of LT (b) (6), Air Operations Duty Officer from 1700, 6 October 1952 to 0800, 7 October 1952.

In my capacity as Air Operations Duty Officer, I was in the air tower and monitoring the GCA run of P47 Bu.No. 53968 which crashed off the approach end of runway #25 at 2350, 6 October 1952.

The weather conditions at the time of the crash were incendi-
te zero and visibility 1/2 mile. This weather was caused by the
plane by the GCA director.

At the time of the crash I was standing just outside of the door of the tower, in such a position where I could hear the radio which was monitoring the GCA run, and also to permit me to have, as nearly as possible, considering the weather, a view of the approach end of runway #25.

The plane itself was never visible to the tower either before or after the crash, until the fog had lifted an hour later. Because of the obscured visibility which made it impossible to visually observe the airplane, the best record is the recording of the GCA run.

While monitoring the latter part of the GCA run, I heard a sound similar to that made by suddenly adding power to the engines, then abrupt silence. I immediately told the tower operator to sound the crash alarm. I then ran down the steps to the operations office and while the flight controller was alerting all parties on the crash phone circuit, I proceeded to call the Executive Officer, Operations officer, Air Maintenance officer, Photographic officer, and GCA officer. The air controlman in the Operations Office then called the Station Chaplains, I called the Ass't Public Works Officer and ordered ~~me~~ to alert the Squadron Commanding Officer and Executive Officer.

Crash boats were alerted and later put on stand-by when the exact position of the crash was ascertained, also the Coast Guard was alerted.

Although the use of rescue aircraft was unnecessary, the Coast Guard did provide the first means of two way communication with the tower by means of a Walkie Talkie. The crash equipment that first arrived on the scene evidently had damaged their receiving equipment in passing over the rough terrain, and they could only transmit but not receive.

As fast as requests for equipment were made to the tower the requests were relayed to the department concerned.

The response and cooperation of all departments concerned was immediate and excellent, especially when the dense fog and hazardous driving conditions were considered. (b) (6)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

APPROXIMATE GLIDE PATH OF
P4Y-2B 599H8 AS DETERMINED
FROM GCA TRANSCRIPTION

ORIGINAL



PATROL SQUADRON -TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6), '01, USN, (b) (6) concerning crash of P4Y
Bu. No. 59988

I gave pilot gear check on side mounts.

The first weather report received from GCA was 1/2 mile vis., 100 ft. ceiling. During approach another report of 1/4 mile vis., 0 ceiling. The final approach controller cleared us for a landing, giving us turn and altitude changes. We were on glide path most of time getting off two or three times for a short time. A short time before crash (30-45 sec) the final controller told the pilot to disregard compass heading and start and stop turns on his command. I don't remember him saying we were too low.

On the first impact (b) (6) asked me what was happening. The pilot gave it full power trying to get straighted out. All the lights went out then and we hit again.

The next thing I remember I was lying on the deck. I saw reflection of a fire and started looking for the after escape hatch. I went out through the hatch and crawled about the top of the fuselage to the rudder and fell to the ground. I saw an engine burning about forty feet from the plane as I started to walk from the plane. I saw (b) about this time and he asked me if I was all right. The Crash crew was there by then and they laid me down on the ground until the ambulance arrived.

(b) (6)

Pertified True Copy
(b) (6)

SECURITY INFORMATION

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PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6) AFAM, USN concerning crash of P4Y Bu. No. 59988

When we touched down I felt a hard bump like one of our landing gear went in a ditch and then we went over on our port wing and after that I can't remember a thing until I crawled out of a hole and (b) helped me to one side.

(b) (6)

ORIGINAL

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of Crash Crew Duty Section Leader, (b) (6), AB2, USN, (b) (6)
concerning the crash of P4Y Bu. No. 59989

Pertaining to the crash of a P4Y at 2358 hours on October 6, 1952 the following are the facts as I saw them.

The crash phone rang at 2358. I answered it and was told that they had lost contact with the plane, making an approach on runway #25 and for me to investigate Area D-7 on the grid map. I sounded the alarm and proceeded with all equipment to D-7 area in search of the aircraft.

The flames of the fire was first sighted when I was approximately 100 yards from the crash. There were two fires, gas and oil type fires, about 30 ft. apart. The men in the CO2 truck on field watch extinguished the fires. Five hundred (500) lbs. of CO2 were used to extinguish the fires.

By this time all equipment was at the scene and was spotted in places that I thought was the best position for combating fire, and rescue method.

Three bodies were found about 60 ft. from the main wreckage. Members of the crash crew covered them up with their fire coats.

By this time the Structural Fire Dept., and the ambulances were at the scene.

Linnburg found one man pinned beneath the wreckage by his legs and with the aid of a Structural fireman we set him clear of the wreckage.

The crash crew assisted the cornsmen in moving bodies into the ambulances.

At about this time (b) (6) came running up and said there were two bodies trapped in the main fuselage of the plane. (b) (6) and myself attempted to enter the fuselage but found that the opening was too small to permit us to enter. I called for two volunteers to go who were able to enter the fuselage. (b) (6) and (b) volunteered to attempt to enter the fuselage.

At this time there was aviation gas leaking all around the fuselage of the plane. Due to the large amount of gas fumes inside the fuselage I instructed (b) (6) and (b) to keep talking at all times, so in case they were ever gone by gas fumes I would be able to assist them.

They were able to extract one man who was unconscious in the after section. They found another man in the tail section, who was dead, and pinned in by structural collapse of the plane. **795 82**

There was so much gas leaking from the plane that the Fire Chief advised us to cover the area with foam. I instructed (b) (6), who was driving the FF-5 to bring the FF-5 around behind the plane and cover the area with foam.

The Structural Fire Dept. laid hose and directed one hose inside the fuselage and another underneath the wing of the plane where gas was flowing, to wash the gas away.

Another body was found in the forward section of the plane in the wreckage of the flight deck, but we were unable to get it out. The public works crane had arrived by this time so I had the driver pull the crane up to the wreckage. Crash slings were taken off of the FF-1 and I hooked one to the wreckage. (Crash slings were taken off of the FF-1 and I hooked one to the wreckage) and had the

crane take a strain. The wreckage was lifted about 3 [redacted] and I crawled under it and pulled the body out.

Cdr. (b) (6) and Lt. (b) (6) were asked for permission to cut the after section of the fuselage of the plane in order to remove the body pinned there. We were given permission to cut the plane.

(b) (6) and myself proceeded to cut the plane. CO2 bottles were trained on the place we were cutting.

After cutting the structure surrounding the body it was removed.

As count by the medical officer told us all bodies had been recovered, Cdr. (b) (6) and Lt. (b) (6) were then asked for permission to leave the men with the exception of one FFI-6 and 4 men to stand fire watch.

(b) (6)



ORIGINAL

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REFURBISHED
SECURITY INFORMATION

Enclosure (57)

STATEMENT

A P4Y type Navy Plane, No. 259988, making an approach on Runway #25, crash-landed to the right of the Runway in rough terrain approximately 500 feet from the landing strip. Six (6) crew members from a crew of twelve were killed instantly in the crash. The other six, two of which were rescued from the wreckage and the other four thrown from the plane scattered about the area, were hospitalized at the Navy Dispensary.

At 2358, a crash alarm was received reporting an expected crash at location D-7 (local grid map). Simultaneously, a phone call was received over the 'fire phone' from (b)(6) SHC, an occupant of barracks 43, reporting what he thought was an explosion and flare-up near the end of Runway "25. On receipt of the crash call, all crash equipment from Air Operations immediately responded to the end of Runway #25. One (1) FFN-5 Crash Truck and one (1) structural fire truck with company immediately responded from Fire Station #1 with the Fire Chief to the scene of the reported crash.

795 84

On arrival of the Fire Department, the Crash Crew with crash equipment comprised of one (1) FFN-5 Crash Truck, Two (2) FFN-1's; one (1) CO₂ Truck and one (1) Water-Tank Truck were already on the scene. Two (2) gas & oil fires about 30 feet apart were immediately extinguished by the Crash Crew using 500 lbs. of CO₂ gas from the CO₂ Crash Truck, on arrival. The plane had smashed in several pieces strewn around a large area and had divided itself into two (2) parts. Three (3) bodies were found on the ground about 60 feet from the main wreckage by the Crash Crew on arrival. These were covered with firemen's coats pending arrival of the ambulances. Another crew member, still alive, was found pinned in the smaller part of the wreckage. This man was rescued by the Crash Crew and Structural Fire Department and placed into an ambulance which had then arrived. Another body was spotted in that part of the wreckage, and it was removed with the assistance of a crane.

In the meantime, another crew member was removed from the main part of the wreckage in an unconscious condition and placed in another ambulance. Another body was sighted at the tail end of the main wreckage, pinned to the deck. An opening had to be cut to remove the body. The remainder of the crew apparently escaped from the wreckage or were thrown out before the arrival of the crash crew and Structural Fire Department. It was made known that all were accounted for.

During the entire operation, a high concentration of gasoline vapors was present due to gas leaks. Foam blankets were laid over the wreckage by the FFN-5 Crash Trucks, and two (2) hose streams were continuously employed as a fog blanket to wet down the gasoline spill. Fortunately, no fire occurred during the operation, except those two fires which were extinguished by the Crash Crew on arrival. However, charged lines and firefighting equipment were kept in readiness around the fuselage during the entire operation. The operation was secured at 0245, but fire watches were maintained during the night and next day by the Crash Crew and Structural Fire Department as precautionary measure against fire.

(b)(6)

Enclosure (58)

Structural Fire Chief

PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY #103, C/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6) ATI, USN, concerning crash of P4Y Bu. No. 59988

What I know of P4Y-2 crash: I was sitting in my living room at (b) (6) listening to the final tune on VQUS which goes off the air at 2400 when I heard a swoosh sound and something that sounded like a muffled explosion, I jumped to the window and saw a small fire, I ran to the phone and called 3322 the phone rang about 8 times but no one answered, I then called the crash crew 4271 and let the phone ring about 5 times and received no answer. I then called the tower and said there was a fire down on the runway. The man who answered said where on the approach end of 25 and I said yes and hung up and jumped out my window and ran toward the crash. I met the sentry by the barracks and he ran with me to the crash. When we arrived the crash trucks were just pulling in and were putting out a fire on something. I ran up behind the tail section and was one man limping out from under the tail section. We both ran to him and helped him over to the crash crew trucks. I started back to the tail section to see if I could help any one out, but gasoline was pouring out of the wings so I didn't go in. I went all around the wreckage to see how many needed help. I opened parachutes and covered some of them and put some flight jackets over them. I stayed by one man who was conscious and tried to do what I could for him. After about 5 minutes the Chaplin bent down over him and I went over to help stretcher bearers. A cook and I carried one dead man and the conscious one to an ambulance then I helped get a man out of the forward part of the wreckage, then the marines told me to leave, I did.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

SECURITY INFORMATION

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PATROL SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
NAVY 3103, C/O FPO, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Statement of (b) (6) AN, USN, concerning the crash of P4Y Bu. No. 59988

Having relieved the evening watch our section had taken the duty, myself the duty dispatcher. I had known that a P4Y was in the GCA pattern but did not know what his position was. I had begun posting inbound FBM's when I noticed that GCA was working the P4Y on final from the sounds from the tower, although I heard no engines. I was standing at the schedule board when I heard what sounded to be the P4Y starting a wave off, a revving of the engines and then a noise. There was no definite sound of impact as the sound seemed to extend over too long a period of time. Approximately 20 seconds later the crash phone rang and Lt. (b) (6) ran down from the tower. I answered the phone and the tower operator, (b) (6) notified all stations by crash phone that there was a suspected crash in the vicinity of the approach end of runway 25/07. While maintaining a stand-by on the crash phone, the duty officer, Lt. (b) (6) began calling the other necessary parties by telephone. I had not noticed the time. After the crash phone was secured under the direction of the duty officer and from my own knowledge, I began also to call other parties by the dispatcher's telephone until all parties were notified. Among those I called were the Chaplin, the dispensary, the Coast Guard, VP-24, and the boat house.

(b) (6)

ORIGINIAL

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~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

Statement of Lt(jg) (b) (6) U.S.N.R. as Squadron Duty Officer
on Monday 6 Oct. 1952.

Subj: Crash of P4Y-2B Type Aircraft Bu.No. 59988

Operations of the squadron VP-84 were carried out in a normal manner until the time of the crash at 2358 local. We had dispatched four aircraft to the operating area at two hour intervals commencing at 1315. The expected duration of flight was nine hours for each aircraft. The first aircraft out piloted by the Commanding Officer returned and made a normal landing. Shortly after, and according to predictions the weather at the field became very undesirable for flying. I became concerned about the safety of our aircraft still out. I instructed the ASDO Chief (b) (6) to call station operations and request them to inform our returning aircraft of the present Argentia weather and also the weather at the alternates, upon their reaching the 50 mile approach limit. Lt(jg) (b) (6) in plane Bureau No. 59772 landed at 2240 after making a normal approach and landing with the aid of G.C.A. At 0002 I was informed by the ASDO of Fasron 106 that he believed one of our planes had crashed. I immediately called station operations and was informed that they believed that our plane Bureau No. 59988 had crashed at the approach end of runway 25 in an attempt to land. I then called the Commanding Officer and dispatched the ASDO to the BOQ to pick him up and take him to the scene of the crash. I also notified the Operations and Maintenance Officers of the squadron who immediately came to the squadron area. When the ASDO returned for the list of names of the crew on the plane I instructed him to remain in the office and carry out the duties assigned while I went to the scene of the crash. Before leaving for the scene of the crash I instructed the ASDO to contact operations and order our remaining plane Bureau No. 59984 piloted by LCDR. (b) (6) to proceed to one of his alternates. On arriving on the field I had to stop at the G.C.A. unit to ask the location of the crash due to the restricted visibility. Arriving at the scene of the crash I proceeded to carry out the duties of the SDO and any instructions issued by the Commanding Officer. Rescue operations were being carried out by the station crash crew and fire dept. Station Operations, under CDR. (b) (6) had the situation well in hand, having alerted all those organizations necessary. By the time I arrived on the scene all those living had been taken to the infirmary and the remainder of the effort was in recovering the bodies from the wreckage. I directed the recovery of the confidential publications that were aboard the plane and proceeded to secure all things that I thought would have a bearing on the causes of the accident. After the recovery of the last body and all dept. but the Marine guard had been secured by CDR. (b) (6) I returned to my duties at the squadron duty office. Arriving at the duty office I was informed by the Commanding Officer that he had appointed me to the Aircraft Accident Board. I was properly relieved by Lt. (b) (6) at 0400 7 Oct. so that I could carry out the duties assigned as a member of the Aircraft Accident Board.

(b) (6)

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Position

1	Name LT F. B. MORTON	Billet PIR
2	L/TG D. A. ELLIS	Co-Pilot
3	(b) (6)	Radar Operator
4	(b) (6)	AD2 Plane Captain
5	LT A. R. KUTAK	Navigator
6	LT R. (n) MILLINE	2nd Navigator
7	(b) (6)	Radiooman
8	LT (n) DEMATO, ATAN	2nd Radiooman
9	(b) (6)	2nd Ordnanceman
10	(b) (6)	1st Ordnanceman
11	(b) (6)	Photographer
12	LT C. REINHOLD, AD2	2nd Mechanic

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

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ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE (DELIVER DUPLICATE TO BASE OPERATIONS AT DESTINATION)					DATE 6 J T 1452
A OPERATIONS OFFICE USNS ARGENTIA					AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. 9988
B OCCUPANTS (State whether crew or passenger. List additional passengers on separate sheet and attach.)					
DUTY	NAME AND INITIALS	GRADE	SERIAL NO.	ORGANIZATION	HOME STATION
PILOT	Horton EB	LT	(b) (6)	VP-24 USN	ARG
C/P	ECCLES JA	LTJG	(b) (6)		
Nav	Wright DR	JT	(b) (6)		
Engr	Kelley R	LT			
FOR CREW REFER "ABLE" STREET AT VR-24 DUES OFFICE → Crew #1 OPERATION AV					
C WEATHER					
CEILINGS AND VISIBILITIES	EXISTING DESTINATION AR	1000	SEQUENCE TIME 1745Z	FORECAST FOR ETC + 2 HOURS DESTINATION AR 2000 3/4 Fog 2110	
	ALTERNATE AR	Clear 3000	1730Z	ALTERNATE AR	clear 1500 2110
BRIEFING VOID AFTER (Time) 1945Z		(WEATHER CONDITIONS INDICATE THAT THIS FLIGHT MAY BE CONDUCTED AS PLANNED)		SIGNATURE OF FORECASTER OR CLEARANCE AUTH. (b) (6) AG	
D FLIGHT PLAN					
RADIO CALL NAV 5796P	AIRCRAFT TYPE PAY-2B	PILOT'S LAST NAME Horton	POINT OF DEPARTURE ARGENTIA		
ALT. 1000	ALT.	ROUTE Dues	ALT. 2000-2100	ALT.	ROUTE
IFR ROUTE Direct	IFR ROUTE	TO 2100-2200 44-30W	TO	TO	VFR
VFR TO TH 3	VFR ROUTE	MILEAGE FROM DEST. 500 miles	NORMAL TRANSMITTING FREQ'S (Frequencies to be used in making radiation reports. Number or letter designation will be used for VHF frequencies.)	WEIGHT AND BALANCE FORM F FILLED AT LOCATION	
DESTINATION BASE NAME ARGENTIA	ALTERNATE 500 miles	USAF RATINGS (1 hr numbers)	10 CHAN VHF	VR-24 OPS	DATE 17 Sept 52
MILEAGE 1000	PILOT	INSTRUMENT	ALL STD M HF		
ETD 1945	EST TRUE AIR 150 KTS	NAVY INSTRUMENT RATINGS (Check box)	ORG I, II, III		
ETC 1040	FUEL IN HOURS 13.0	<input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input type="checkbox"/> STANDARD 12-29-52 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL			
(DRAFT ONLY) PLANE INSTRUMENT QUALIFICATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input type="checkbox"/> STANDARD <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL					
REMARKS: 1. OPERATIONAL FLIGHT On Station 2 hours					
E FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION					
SUBMITTED TO	TIME	BY	PILOT'S SIGNATURE		
			SIGNATURE OF CLEARING AUTHORITY F. B. SCHAEDE		
INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL			Commanding Officer		
TRANS. TO TOWER OR PILOT BY:			SIGNATURE OF CLEARING OFFICER F. B. SCHAEDE		
ARRIVED AT	TIME	NAME	GRADE OR POSITION		



FNC/65015 (64)



ENCL 100-111 (62)





223 90



5-10-10-223 90



ENCLOSURE (69)







ENCLOSURE (72)

A black and white photograph showing the side of a severely damaged aircraft. The word "NAVY" is painted in large, bold letters across the fuselage. The aircraft's skin is torn and shredded, particularly along the bottom edge where the fuselage meets the ground. A circular window or hatch is visible on the right side. The background is a plain, light-colored wall.

NAVY

295101



ENCLOSURE (75)





SP 104



ENCLOSURE (77)



MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

ACCIDENT

1. This report shall be filed in the event the accident involves one or more of the following:

Death	Ejection
Injury, treated or not	Ditching
Bailout	Crash into water

2. Completion of the form shall be the responsibility of the flight surgeon serving as a member of the Aircraft Accident Board. He shall be assisted by the medical officer first reporting to the scene of the accident, or in the event no such officer reports to the scene, by the officer supervising treatment of the injured.

3. This form shall be prepared in triplicate. One copy shall be turned over to the Aircraft Accident Board, and the original shall be mailed direct to Chief of Naval Operations (FLIGHT SAFETY), Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C., within 96 hours following the accident. The

copy shall be mailed direct to Safety Equipment Branch, BuAEF, Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. Where more than one aircraft is involved, separate forms must be completed for each craft wherein one or more of the requirements in Paragraph 1 above are applicable. (Additional copies may be prepared for use of Squadron flight surgeons and other interested individuals).

4. Include photographs illustrating impact(s), damage to cockpit, structures causing injury, etc.

5. For type of accident, and damage, use code as in SPNAV-53-339.

6. Addenda are encouraged.

PART I. ACCIDENT IDENTIFICATION

US NAVAL STATION, NAVY #103, FPO N.Y.N.Y.		NC-AACI 3-53	
U.S. NAVAL STATION, ARGENTIA, NEWFOUNDLAND		1358	6 October 1952
59988	P4Y-2B	3	A
Pilot - Commander, Aircrew		Date of Incident	
(b) (6)		Signature of Commander	
Sgt W. SHELTON		USN Commanding Officer	
LCDR Petron 24		10 October 1952	

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	<input type="checkbox"/> NOT INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	<input type="checkbox"/> LAND-BASED OPERATIONS, CONTINENTAL	
<input type="checkbox"/> FOREIGN	<input type="checkbox"/> RESERVE PROGRAM	<input type="checkbox"/> TRAINING COMMAND (including refresher)	<input type="checkbox"/> CARRIER OPERATIONS
SACRED - Registration No.		(b) (6)	
SACRED - Registration No.		LT MC USN 10 October 1952	
SACRED - Registration No.		USN Commanding Officer	
SACRED - Registration No.		LCDR Petron 24 10 October 1952	

PART II. PILOT AND GENERAL SAFETY FACTORS

NONE

795106

All survivors agree cabin environment was comfortable throughout the flight. The altitude did not exceed 2500 feet.

2. COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT	CHECK ONE
VENTILATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
REFRIGERATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HEATING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
PRESSURIZATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	CHECK ONE
SHOULDER HARNESS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
INERTIA REEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
PROTECTIVE HELMET, TYPE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OXYGEN MASK, TYPE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
G-SUIT, TYPE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JETTISONED CANOPY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OPENED CANOPY BY OTHER EMERGENCY MEANS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OTHER <u>Ditching Platform</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OTHER	

SECURITY INFORMATION

See attached sheet

PART III PERSONNEL

DIRECTIONS

1. Under NAMES AND DESIGNATION NO. OF PERSONNEL, list each name followed by initials. (IN ALL INSTANCES LIST PILOT IN NUMBER 1 POSITION.)

2. At all other points on this form, each of the personnel shall be designated merely by the number to the left of his name in the listing below.

3. Use additional sheets as necessary, filing separate form for each aircraft.

4. Under RANK OR RATE, if Reserve, also give reserve status using following code: Active Duty - "A"; Reserve - "R"; Associated Volunteer - "AV"; Associate Volunteer Unit - "AVU"; Volunteer Aviation Unit - "VAU"; Other Volunteer - "OV". If on training cruise add "T" to other codes i.e., "AT", "RT", etc.

5. Under INJURY CLASS, use following key:

Class "A" = Injuries resulting in death within 30 days.
Class "B" = Serious injuries including amputations, fractures except simple of fingers and toes, lacerations involving muscle or causing severe hemorrhage, injury to internal organs, or any injury which will render incapable for 3 or more days.

Class "C" = All minor injuries.
Class "D" = Missing and presumed drowned.
Class "E" = Missing.

NOTE: Later unnecessary changes from "B" to "A" in thirty day period should be forwarded if voluntary.

6. Under DISPOSITIONS use following key:

"0" = UNINJURED. "X" = Hospitalization.
"W" = Treated and returned to duty without "I" = Remaining to undergo hospitalization. without autopsy.

NAMES AND DESIGNATION NO. OF PERSONNEL	FILE OR SERVICE NO.	RANK OR RATE	DUTY ABOARD PLANE (Or on ground or in dock)	AGE	POSITION OCCUPIED IN PLANE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	INJURY CLASS	DISPOSITION
HORTON, F.B. (1312)		LT	Pilot in control	32	Right side pilot's cabin	A	X
KELLY, A.J. (1315)		LT	Navigator Special crew	35	Navigator's table Seat in reserve	A	X
MURRAY, R. (1316)		LT	Crew	31	rear flight deck	A	X
MURRAY, D.A. (1310)		LTJO	Co-Pilot 1st. Ord Aer. Med. Men	28	Pilot's cabin After station	A	X
(b) (6)		AOL	against Port Blk.	27	Flight deck against	B	X
(b) (6)		AOL	Plane Capt.	25	Blk. behind #6	B	X
(b) (6)		AD2	2nd. Mech.	21	After station over rear hatch	A	X
(b) (6)		AD2	1st. Mech.	22	Flight deck port side radio seat	B	X

SUMMARIES OF INJURIES AND CAUSES

9 thru 12 on attached sheet

DIRECTIONS

1. Summarize all personnel injuries by placing designation numbers assigned in PART III in appropriate squares (e.g., if the pilot suffered severe shock, cerebral concussion and severe lacerations of head, a small figure "1" should be placed in all pertinent squares.)

2. If injuries are multiple extreme, list all major injuries.


(b) (6)

3. Where injuries were fatal, indicate probable cause of death by placing an "X" after number in the pertinent square (e.g., if No. 2 were killed having suffered a cranial fracture and mild contusions of the trunk, an "X" should be placed after the "2" under CRANIAL FRACTURE.)


4. Remarks and suggestions are encouraged.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)




(b) (6)



AMPUTATIONS

(b) (6)



INTERNAL INJURIES (SUMMARIZE IF AUTOPSY WAS PERFORMED)

795108

CAUSES OF INJURIES

WHAT SPECIFIC PARTS OF THE AIRCRAFT CAUSED THE INJURIES (LIST AND DESCRIBE). (ENTER IN CAPITAL LETTERS.)
NOTES: "DISTILLED OR IMPACT", "DETERMINED", WITH AN UNDERLINED
UNDERLYING NUMBER AND OPINION WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED.)

See attached sheets

REFUGEE
SECURITY INFORMATION

PART V. BAILOUT AND EJECTION DATA

(use separate form for each person)

<input type="checkbox"/> BAILOUT	<input type="checkbox"/> ATTEMPTED BAILOUT	<input type="checkbox"/> EJECTION SEAT USED	<input type="checkbox"/> SHOULD HAVE BAILED OUT BUT DIDN'T
7. REASON PILOT DIDN'T BAIL OUT.		8. ALTITUDE OF PLANE AT TIME OF EXIT: ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ FT. TERRAIN _____ FT.	
9. INDICATED AIR SPEED OF PLANE AT TIME OF EXIT. _____ KNOTS		10. APPROXIMATE ALTITUDE ABOVE TERRAIN PILOT LEFT EJECTION SEAT. _____ FT.	
11. APPROXIMATE ALTITUDE ABOVE TERRAIN CHUTE OPENED. _____ FT.		12. WAS FREE FALL DELIBERATE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
13. PILOT EQUIPMENT QUICK DISCONNECT USED. <input type="checkbox"/> YES TYPE: _____		14. IN CASE OF BAILOUT OR EJECTION, SUBMIT PILOT'S NARRATIVE OF ENTIRE EVENT. GIVE SEQUENCE OF OPERATION OF EJECTION SEAT AND COMMENT ON FUNCTIONAL OPERATION OF SEAT.	
15. LIST ANY DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED ON BAILOUTS OR EJECTIONS OR ADDITIONAL SHEET.		16. TYPE PARACHUTE AND HARNESS.	
17. POSITION OF BODY AT TIME OF LANDING.		18. WEATHER.	
19. WIND.		20. KNOTS	
PART VI. DITCHING DATA (Include crashes into water) (use separate form for each person)			
1. <input type="checkbox"/> DITCHED AIRCRAFT <input type="checkbox"/> CRASHED INTO WATER		2. METHOD OF EXIT.	
3. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT USED: <input type="checkbox"/> EXPOSURE SUIT, (type) _____		<input type="checkbox"/> LIFE VEST, (type) _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> RAFT, (type) _____		<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, (type) _____	
4. TIME IN WATER: _____ HOURS		MINUTES	5. TEMPERATURE OF: WATER _____ OF _____ AIR _____ OF _____
6. RECOMMENDATIONS ON EQUIPMENT INCLUDED ON ADDENDUM: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		7. SURVIVORS NARRATIVE INCLUDED. (To be included if possible.) <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
8. METHOD OF RESCUE.			

PART VII. REMARKS

See attached sheets

795109

PART II - PILOT AND GENERAL SAFETY FACTORS(Continued)

3. COMMENT ON EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT:

Shoulder harnesses were worn only by the pilot and co-pilot, both fatalities. Although the forces were tremendous in this accident, the pilot was found in his seat with the shoulder harness intact. (b) (6)

(b) (6)

A special safety feature of the P4Y is a ditching platform above the hatch of the after station. The single crew member in this location at the time of impact sustained fatal injuries. It is not known whether or not he was braced against the canvas sling at the rear of this platform.

PART III - PERSONNEL(Continued)

NAME & DESIGNATION OR SER. NO. OR DUTY ON AIRCRAFT POSITION INJURY DISPO	RANK	CLASS	SITTING		
				NAME	VICE NUMBER
J. Deayo, M.	(b) (6)	ATAN	2nd Ra-20	After stat- dio op- erator	A Z
				ditching	
				platform	
10. (b) (6)	(b) (6)	ATAN	Radar 22	Flight deck B starboard	X
			Operator	behind pil- ot	
11. (b) (6)	(b) (6)	AON	2nd Ord-22	After Stat- B man	X
			Navigation	ion sitting on ladder	
12. (b) (6)		AFT	Photo- 25	After Stat- B grapher	X
			grapher	ion port side against Blk	

PART IV - CAUSES OF INJURIES

In general it was difficult to determine the exact fashion in which the fatal and non-fatal injuries were sustained. The flight surgeon was not on the scene of the accident when the bodies were removed from the wreckage. The complete demolition of the cockpit and flight deck also made any strict analysis of injuries impossible. (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) As has been mentioned, the pilot was found in his seat and free of the main cockpit debris.

(b) (6)

(b)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Men were about the navigation table with no bulkheads or heavy gear in front of them, yet there were three survivors who were on the flight deck at the time of the crash. #6, (b) (6), prepared himself for the crash by sitting upon a (b) (6).

Enclosure (79)

APPENDIX TO MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATED
10-10-52 (ctd)

tool box on the port side of the plane. He braced his back against the bulkhead directly behind the cockpit and faced aft.

#10 (b) (6) was seated facing forward, facing his radio equipment. #8 was found clear of the main wreckage. (b) (6) (b) (6). This man was seated facing his radio gear, looking forward from the rear of the flight deck, port side.

There were two fatalities among the men in the after station. It was in the ditching platform sling. (b) (6)

(b) (6) From the photographs with this report the rear platform can be seen shaded off in the area of the platform at, (b) (6)

(b) (6) was pinned deep in the tail section of [REDACTED] as the plane crashed over the test switch.

the after station. He was seated in the rear seat of the plane. The man nearby was seated #12 who [REDACTED] (b) (6). This man was seated with his back against the port bulkhead. After the crash he found himself entangled with #7, but the former was able to climb out of the wreckage on his own.

5 was also seated with his back against the port bulkhead, but more forward in the rear station. (b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6) was seated on the bottom rung of the ladder leading into the after station. He was facing aft.

Part VII - READING

795111

This F4Y-2S left the deck at Argentia at 1516 on 6 October 1952 on a routine operational flight. Upon returning to this base extremely foul and foggy weather was encountered locally. At approximately 2335 the aircraft entered the GCA pattern, and proceeded to begin a normal instrument approach.

According to the plane captain, the approach seemed to be all right until he saw the runway lights from the co-captain window. He then realized their altitude was too low for the attitude of the plane. Sensing danger he assumed his position behind the co-pilot against the bulkhead separating the cockpit from the rest of the flight deck. He then states he saw the left wing drag and the outboard engine fall out. He saw this through a port window.

It is not yet determined what happened but the pilot seems to have added power or the aircraft may have bounded up into the air.

The wreckage was found strewn very far to the left of the intended landing runway, and there was evidence of contact with the ground and dragging several hundred feet short of the paved runway. The plane may have cartwheeled or toppled through the air before the final impact with its crumpling and demolishing effects.

ADDENDUM TO MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATED
10-10-52 (ctd)

There was no evidence to support pilot fatigue or any physiological disturbance with either pilot or co-pilot. The plane commander who brought the aircraft in was quite familiar with the GCA procedure.

PART VII - REMARKS

In general, the survivors of this crash seemed to be those men who were seated with their backs up against some solid structure during impact. Some of them were facing aft, others were facing the center of the plane from the port side. Safety belts were not used except for the pilot and the co-pilot who also wore locked shoulder harnesses. These devices withstood the forces fairly well; however, the seats themselves were torn from their moorings.

795112

ORIGINAL

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION